The Genealogy of the Idea of Monarchy in the Post-Soviet Political Discourse of the Russian Orthodox Church by Suslov, Mikhail
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet








Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Suslov, M. (2016). The Genealogy of the Idea of Monarchy in the Post-Soviet Political Discourse of the Russian
Orthodox Church. State, Religion and Church, 3(1), 27-62.
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
S TATE ,  REL I G I ON  AND  CHURCH  ( 2 0 1 6 )  3 ( 1 ) :  2 7   –   6 2  27
MIKHAIL  SUSLOV
The Genealogy of the Idea of Monarchy 
in the Post-Soviet Political Discourse 
of the Russian Orthodox Church
Translation by Jan Surer
Mikhail Suslov — Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, 
Uppsala University (Sweden). mikhail.suslov@ucrs.uu.se
This article focuses on the concept of monarchy with an em-
phasis on the traditional Russian “autocratic” model. Mikhail 
Suslov inquires into the ways this concept is being used in to-
day’s Russian Orthodox Church and in the circles of religious-
ly motivated intellectuals. Informed by the “contextualist” tra-
dition in conceptual history, this article traces the concept of 
monarchy back to pre-revolutionary  and émigré thinkers and 
argues that two understandings of the term have been evolv-
ing throughout Russia’s modern history: the tradition of “di-
vine kingship” (tsarebozhie), now largely marginalized, and 
the Slavophile interpretation that shifted substantially toward 
the idea of popular sovereignty and is now dominant in official 
and mainstream Orthodox political thought. The Slavophile 
concept of monarchy is internally contradictory and unstable, 
making its usage problematic, but, at the same time, it opens 
the possibility for new and original theorizing.
Keywords: Russian Orthodox Church, monarchy, monarchism, 
divine kingship, popular sovereignty, Slavophile, “Bases of the 
Social Conception.” 
BEFORE the fall of the monarchy in February 1917, the figure of the autocratic tsar was for many centuries the center of the Russian political world. Political theorists justified the monar-
chy and proposed measures to strengthen it, while the common peo-
ple handed down from generation to generation the habits of the “lan-
guage of monarchy” and “monarchist sentiments.” Paradoxically, even 
early 20th-century anti-monarchist discourse was bound up with an 
ingrained monarchism — indeed the very criticism of the monarchy 
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often arose from the contrast between the actual tsar and the ideal-
ized image of a monarch.¹ Conversely, at times intellectuals’ concep-
tualization of the autocratic monarchy prompted them to acknowledge 
the necessity of radical reform and to refuse loyalty to the actual tsar 
in the name of realizing ideal autocracy (see Luk’ianov 2006: 54–59). 
The fact is that monarchism, and political traditionalism in general, 
resists rational interpretation and theoretical analysis. A monarchist 
has already lost his case as soon as he attempts to defend his political 
convictions by argument. In the monarchist’s ideal world, such a sit-
uation could not even arise thanks to the “natural” and “self-evident” 
character of the monarchist system.
Precisely for this reason, in Russia, with its thousand-year experi-
ence of monarchy, monarchism as an ideology was paradoxically un-
derdeveloped. This played a fatal role for the Romanov dynasty: the 
pre-revolutionary regime proved incapable of securing mass support 
amid the competitive politics of the early 20th century. Some mon-
archists openly refused to deliberate on the topic of governance, as-
serting that autocracy in Russia concerned the realm of faith, mys-
ticism and emotions and did not lend itself to analysis. Note the 
following statements by early 20th-century commentators: in Vasi-
ly Rozanov’s words, “Tsarist rule is a miracle” (Rozanov 1912). Ac-
cording to Nikolai Cherniaev, “Russian autocracy (…) [can] not but 
seem a supernatural matter, which is satisfactorily explained only 
through the participation of Providence in the fates of peoples” (Cher-
niaev 1998: 18). Sergei Bulgakov wrote that before his “conversion” to 
monarchism he “did not love the Tsar,” for “the question of monar-
chy is, in essence, a question of love or non-love” (quoted in Kolonit-
skii 2010: 10). 
Rationally arguing the impossibility of rational argumentation con-
cerning the monarchy, these monarchists fell into the liar’s paradox. 
Consequently, in pre-revolutionary Russia many intellectuals were 
convinced supporters of the monarchy, but few were monarchists. For 
example, the notorious Konstantin Pobedonostsev, whose rehabilita-
tion in post-Soviet Russia has played a major role in the formation of 
contemporary conservatism, was undoubtedly a staunch monarchist, 
but his theoretical ruminations on monarchy were unoriginal and in-
consequential for intellectual history. Other monarchist intellectuals 
1. For the latest research devoted to the nuances of (anti-) monarchist consciousness, one 
can point to Kolonitskii 2010: 552–65. In an earlier period, monarchist mythology lay 
at the root of mass protest movements—and not only in Russia. See the rich literature 
on this, for example Field 1976 and Hobsbawm 1971.
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who tried to develop original monarchist theories came under suspi-
cion of the authorities and sometimes also found themselves under 
arrest. To the authorities, even dissidents on the right were first and 
foremost dissidents. 
The Orthodox Church, with its experience of cooperating with 
the monarchy throughout the history of Russian statehood, was al-
ways a reliable ally of the rulers. But by the end of the imperial peri-
od the relations between church and monarchy had become problem-
atic. Criticism of “caesaropapism” — that is, the assimilation of the 
church as a branch of the state bureaucracy — resounded increasing-
ly in church circles (see, for example, Hedda 2008: 153–75). At the 
same time, the inherited intellectual tradition of the sacralization of 
the monarchy contrasted all the more irresolvably with the process-
es of modernization. After the Manifesto of October 17, 1905 — the 
third point of which read, “[This manifesto] establishes as an invio-
lable rule that no law can come into force without the approval of the 
State Duma,” thereby formally, at least, abolishing the autocratic pow-
er of the tsar — sacred kingship generally sounded like a joke or, at 
best, a legend from the distant past. Finally, the particular attempts to 
theorize autocratic power rationally that I will examine below created 
ideological tension between reality and the imagined ideal, effective-
ly undermining the actually existing dynasty. Occupying the honora-
ble first position in Uvarov’s political formulation “Orthodoxy, Autoc-
racy, Nationality,” the Orthodox Church did not rush to the aid of the 
tottering dynasty in 1917. As is well known, soon after Nicholas II’s 
abdication Church leaders hastened to express their joy at the libera-
tion of the Church from state oversight and initiated the relevant re-
visions of doctrine and liturgy. These Church reformers included such 
churchmen as Archpriest Ioann Vostorgov, the author of “The Monar-
chist Catechism” of 1911 (see “The Resolution of the Moscow Council 
of Deans [blagochinnykh] [March 7, 1917]” in Babkin 2006: 193–95). 
And note also the resolution of the Church Council not to sing “Many 
Years” to the emperor and members of his family (Babkin 2006: 379), 
which signified that the Church silently supported the abolition of the 
monarchy in Russia. In fact, the position of the Orthodox clerical hi-
erarchs regarding the monarchy was one of the most important fac-
tors in the desacralization of autocratic rule and the development of 
the revolutionary process in the spring and autumn of 1917. 
In contemporary Russia, people often idealize the actual interac-
tion between the Church and the monarchy in the pre-revolutionary 
period, while a folkloric (lubochnyi) image of tsarist rule enjoys pop-
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ularity among sizeable groups of the population. A recent poll con-
ducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) in 
March 2013 showed that 24 percent of Russians have nothing against 
the idea of the restoration of the monarchy; an analogous survey in 
2006 numbered potential monarchists at 19 percent. In the same pe-
riod the number of opponents of monarchy has also increased insig-
nificantly: from 66 percent in 2006 to 67 percent in 2013. Thus, we 
can speak of the stabilization of the number of monarchist sympathiz-
ers at a level of approximately one-fifth of the population (“Monarkh-
iia v Rossii” 2013). 
At present, the weakness of political monarchism can be explained 
with recourse to several factors. First, there is the significant rupture 
with pre-revolutionary political thought and tradition. The system-
atic “purge” of monarchist elements from the country in the 1920s 
led to the entire core of the Russian monarchist tradition continu-
ing its existence in emigration. Divided into several branches and 
dynastic lines, the present representatives of the House of Romanov 
abroad are unknown in contemporary Russia and arouse little inter-
est among the Russian population. The monarchist tradition in the 
Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is not so much being restored as 
being created from scratch. Despite mass republication of pre-revo-
lutionary monarchist theorists by nationalist and radical right-wing 
publishers, the current level of political discussion about autocracy 
remains quite low. The assimilation of monarchist ideology on the 
popular level goes no further than idiosyncratically understood and 
quite superficial ideas. Therefore, public discussion of the theory of 
monarchy rarely goes beyond the bounds of considering the histor-
ical achievements and aesthetic appeal of the pre-revolutionary em-
pire. That is, monarchy is a marker of a specific worldview rather 
than the product of rationalistic theorizing and political planning. In 
the same way, at the institutional level as well monarchism has not 
thus far been represented by political parties and movements of all-
Russian scope. For instance, only in 2012 did the Ministry of Justice 
register the first Monarchist Party of the Russian Federation, head-
ed by the Urals-based magnate Anton Bakov (“V Moskve uchrezde-
na” 2012).
Second, the monarchists’ factionalism does not facilitate success-
ful institutionalization. Already at the end of the Soviet period two 
main camps of monarchists came together: the “legitimists,” who af-
firm that the Romanov dynasty continues to enjoy the right to the 
Russian throne, and the “assemblyists” (soborniki), who demand a 
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decision on a candidate for monarch by universal vote, that is, an 
“assembly” (sobor). The legitimists are also not a monolithic move-
ment, for varying dynastic reckonings and the legal systems of dif-
ferent countries permit the designation of several possible claimants. 
The Russian Monarchist Party, for example, supports the candidacy 
of Prince Karl Emich of Leiningen, who recently adopted Orthodoxy 
and took the name Nikolai Kirillovich. In the view of the “assembly-
ists,” an Assembly of the Land (Pomestnyi zemskii sobor) should 
be called, and, like the Assembly of 1613, it should elect (“call,” as 
adherents of this view prefer to say) a tsar, not restricting itself to 
one specific dynasty. Archbishop Gavriil (Chemodakov) of Montreal 
and Canada, for example, supports this position. (On contemporary 
monarchists, see, for example, “Russkie monarkhisty” 1996; Krylov 
2013.)
Does all this mean that we should discount monarchism as a se-
rious ideological force in contemporary Russia? Most likely, monar-
chism does in fact possess great potential for growth and emergence 
from the “gray zone” of political marginality in Russia against the 
background of disillusionment with liberal democracy and the cur-
rent regime’s “tightening of the screws.” This article seeks to demon-
strate that monarchism plays an important role in the political philos-
ophy of Orthodox Christianity and also cannot be ignored in political 
debates outside the Church. One of the central theses of “The Bases 
of the Social Conception of the Russian Orthodox Church,” ratified at 
the Bishops’ Council of 2000 (points III.1–III.7), is devoted to this 
topic. In order to understand what significance present-day Orthodox 
intellectuals ascribe to monarchism, in this article I trace the ideo-
logical genealogy of monarchism in Russian political theory with the 
aid of a close reading of “The Bases of the Social Conception” (here-
after, “Bases”) and the reconstruction of the intellectual context to 
which it relates. 
A concept of ideology as the “decontestation” of political debate 
serves as this investigation’s theoretical basis. This means the abil-
ity of ideology to fix the meaning of concepts that, outside an ideo-
logical system, are “essentially contested.” For example, we do not 
understand what a person means by “freedom” until we have discov-
ered in what ideological context the term is used, in other words, un-
til we have determined whether this person supports the ideology of 
liberalism or socialism, for example. The concept of “monarchy” also 
means different things in different contexts: in the perception of lib-
eral democracy “monarchy” has one meaning; in Russian traditional-
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ism, another.² The concept of monarchy, however (as with any oth-
er essentially contested idea), possesses a complex internal structure 
and dynamic. Therefore, the investigation of the concept of monarchy 
involves two analytical strategies: contextualization (that is, the iden-
tification of the intellectual context that determines the meaning of 
monarchy at a definite moment in time³) and a morphological analy-
sis of the concept. 
The article’s main thesis is that the ROC accepts principally the 
Slavophile interpretation of autocracy in its late imperial version. On 
the one hand, this is actually one of the most thoroughly developed 
monarchist doctrines known in Russia. On the other hand, it arose 
during the period of the monarchy’s decline and as its intellectual “pil-
lar.” In that era, monarchist theory was “modernized” by the inclu-
sion of elements of nationalism and the concept of popular sovereign-
ty. But with that the understanding of monarchy became contradictory, 
for the question of the ultimate source of authority — the divine will 
or the people’s will — remained suspended in air. The “archaeology” 
of monarchist thought in the ROC reveals that monarchism’s cultural 
resources, in the form in which they are being developed in contem-
porary Russia, are not able to form a sufficiently firm foundation for 
ideological constructions, inasmuch as the present-day theory of mon-
archism cannot escape from Slavophile paradoxes. 
Is Monarchy Preferable in the Opinion of the ROC 
Leadership?
Reliable sociological data does not yet exist on the extent of mon-
archist ideas among the clergy and laity of the ROC, but some scat-
tered facts permit the assertion that these ideas find a much greater 
response within the Church than in the country on average (see Tu-
runen 2007)⁴. Just what is the position of official Orthodoxy on this 
matter? A resolution of the Bishops’ Council speaks of “the non-pref-
erability to the Church of any state system, any of the existing political 
2. The research methodology summarized above owes much to Freeden 1998. 
3. The contextual approach was developed by the so-called Cambridge School of intellec-
tual history. Of the members of this school, Quentin Skinner exerted the greatest influ-
ence on the present work. See Skinner 1969; Skinner 2002.  
4. See also a small collection of interviews conducted with clergy for the portal www.re-
gions.ru. Of six Orthodox priests, six supported monarchy, while at the same time not 
one of the Muslim and Jewish religious leaders supported monarchy [“Sviashchennoslu-
zhiteli o monarkhicheskoi idee” (2012)].)
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philosophies and any specific social forces and their leaders, includ-
ing those now in power” (“O vzaimootnosheniiakh Tserkvi s gosu-
darstvom” 1994).⁵ “Bases” (III.7, paragraph 3) quotes this assertion, 
especially emphasizing that the ROC does not interfere with the peo-
ple’s free choice regarding the forms and methods of government, “or 
at least does not oppose their choice” (III.7, paragraph 1). Quite rea-
sonably in the same section (III.7, paragraph 3), “Bases” notes that 
the “non-preferability” principle is linked to the Church’s main con-
cern lying “not [in] the external organization of the state, but [in] the 
condition of its members’ hearts” (see Kirill [Gundiaev] 2008). Stress-
ing that there is no “equal sign” between monarchism and Orthodoxy, 
commentator Alexander Arkhangelsky, in the pages of the Journal of 
the Moscow Patriarchate, expresses his view on the permissibility and 
conventionality of all forms of government “except for absolute total-
itarianism and regimes hostile to humanity” (“XX vek v istorii Rossii” 
2010: 73). One can compare, too, the words of Arkady Maler: “The 
symphony of Church and state is possible in the most varied forms 
and with the most varied state systems, excluding the two extremes 
(…) which are tyranny and anarchy” (Maler 2012).
It would seem that with this it would be possible to put the mat-
ter to rest and close the topic of “monarchism in Orthodoxy.” For the 
authors of “Bases,” however, these reflections merely frame the sec-
tion’s central thesis (III.7), which establishes a hierarchy of the forms 
of state power: the era of the biblical judges (judgeship), monarchy 
and democracy. At first, under the judges, “the right to rule was ef-
fected not through coercion, but by force of authority; moreover, this 
authority was accompanied by divine sanction.” Subsequently, “un-
der monarchy, power remains God-given, but for its exercise it em-
ploys coercion rather than spiritual authority.” Finally, contempo-
rary democracies “do not seek divine approval of their governance” 
(III.7, paragraph 2). 
In the next paragraph of “Bases” bold type sets apart the main 
idea: “One can by no means exclude the possibility of a spiritual re-
newal of society such that a religiously higher form of state structure 
5. Patriarch Alexy II consistently supported the concept of “non-preferability.” In address-
ing whether monarchy was a superior political system, he answered: “As far as the 
Church is concerned, there cannot be any everlasting, non-transitory national state ar-
rangements” (Aleksii II [Ridiger] 1991: 4). In contrast, Metropolitan Kirill during that 
time had developed a largely positive view of monarchy, linking the upheavals of the 
20th century in Russia with the weakening of Orthodoxy and monarchism (Kirill [Gun-
diaev] 1993: 11).
ARTICLES
34  ©  S TATE ·  REL I G I ON  ·  CHURCH
becomes natural” (III.7, paragraph 3). In this way, “Bases” acknowl-
edges that different forms of state power have a different relation to 
religion and morality: some are “religiously higher,” others less so. 
Naturally, the Church prefers the former to the latter, for the “reli-
giously higher” forms offer greater opportunities for care for the “con-
dition of hearts.” But if the form of government depends on morali-
ty, then the Church cannot be indifferent to the form of government. 
In this sense monarchy is good not simply from the standpoint of its 
political functionality, but also because of its particular beneficence 
toward the religious needs of the population. This brings into doubt 
the thesis of “non-preferability” of this or that state system; its par-
adoxical inclusion in the very section that refutes it deliberately sof-
tens the rather strong impression left by the Church’s decisive stand 
on the political question. 
The ideas of the authors of “Bases” enjoy wide currency among 
ROC clerics. For example, as Archpriest Alexander Shargunov notes, 
“an Orthodox monarchy (…) secures the majority of people the most 
favorable conditions for salvation” (Aleksandr [Shargunov] 2008). In 
the context of recent political debates Archpriest Gennady Belovo-
lov discussed a soul-saving Orthodox monarchy in the following way: 
“If an Orthodox Tsar were in power, is it possible to imagine that he 
would remain indifferent to the murder of his own loyal subjects in the 
womb?! I think that on the first day of his accession to the throne an 
Orthodox Sovereign would ban this outrage. (…) Or what Tsar would 
permit the giving over of his young subjects into a family overseas 
with a complete change of their faith and citizenship.” Subsequently, 
in commentary on his own text, he clarified his position: “In a democ-
racy they will make you fill your heart with Snickers, whereas in an 
Orthodox Tsardom you will have greater opportunity ‘to occupy your 
heart with God’” (Gennadii [Belovolov] 2010). 
The priest Dmitry Sverdlov (banned from service for five years from 
January 14, 2013) noted the internal contradiction of the position of 
“Bases” regarding monarchy: “‘The Bases of the Social Conception’ (…) 
leaves an ambiguous impression when it touches on monarchy. For ex-
ample, it says there that ‘the Church accepts the relevant choice of the 
people,’ when the topic concerns the ‘forms and methods of govern-
ment.’ Yet, of all the possible forms of social structure, the document 
designates only monarchy, along with theocracy (…), as ‘God-given.’ 
(…) Such double-mindedness leaves a person of the Church wide lat-
itude for dreaming precisely of monarchy” (Sverdlov 2012). But then 
again, opponents of monarchy, too, can refer to the same sections in 
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“Bases” to support their position. For example, the journal Foma, ap-
proved by the Publishing Council of the ROC, holds a skeptical view of 
monarchy. In 2008 the journal organized a special forum, “Should an 
Orthodox Person Be a Monarchist?” to which one of the originators of 
“Bases,” Professor Andrei Zubov, for example, contributed. Zubov as-
serted that “when a society begins to increase in its Christian self-con-
sciousness, then with time monarchy becomes unnecessary. (…) Be-
cause people themselves can find their own paths as they walk before 
God” (“Dolzhen li pravoslavnyi chelovek byt’ monarkhistom?” 2008). 
In other words, his position, based on an interpretation of the same 
“Bases,” directly contradicts Archpriest Alexander Shargunov’s posi-
tion mentioned above. 
Here one must note that the monarchist argumentation in “Bases” 
has nothing in common with constitutional law. The “juridical” termi-
nology in “Bases” is indefinite and obscure: the work labels roughly 
the same entity as “social organization,” “form and method of govern-
ment,” “form of rule,” “ruling form,” “form of state structure” (III.7). 
From the perspective of constitutional law, juxtaposing monarchy and 
democracy (III.7, paragraph 2) is as senseless as comparing apples 
and oranges, since they characterize different aspects of the state: a 
form of government (monarchy or republic) and a political system 
(rezhim) (democracy, authoritarianism, totalitarianism). A concept 
such as “judgeship” would perplex any legal expert. According to Kon-
stantin Kostiuk, the conception of “judgeship” is a “valuable finding” 
in “Bases,” since its utter unattainability and irrelevance “permits dis-
tancing oneself equally from all [actually existing] political forms” and 
thereby makes the thesis of “non-preferability” more persuasive (Ko-
stiuk 2013: 364). 
The point is this: Concerning monarchy, “Bases” is referring to a 
different intellectual tradition, one in which monarchy signifies exclu-
sively the traditional Russian autocracy, whose foundations the docu-
ment seeks in the biblical history of Israel’s first kings. With this move 
the historically and geographically local phenomenon of the autocrat-
ic monarchy is elevated to the level of a universal model of “social or-
ganization.” Nevertheless, the proposed hierarchy — judgeship, mon-
archy, democracy — still makes its classifications on varying principles, 
for it leaves significant gaps: for example, the European monarchies 
of the absolutist period, which “did not seek divine approval of their 
rule,” were monarchies only on a symbolic level (that is, they were not 
monarchies from the perspective of “Bases”), yet nor were they democ-
racies in any sense of that word.  
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Be that as it may, “Bases” determined that from the religious per-
spective “monarchy” is preferable to “democracy,” something that 
rightist intellectuals have not failed to notice. (See, for example, Se-
menko 2001 [2000]: 160.) One must understand the assertion of 
monarchy’s preferability in the context of two other very important 
theses of “Bases.” The first holds that the state and the Church have 
different “natures”: “The Church was founded directly by God Himself 
(…) while the divine establishment of state rule reveals itself indirectly 
in the historical process” (III.3, paragraph 1). This interpretation im-
bues the Church’s understanding of political phenomena, including its 
interpretation of monarchy, with great significance. Second, one of the 
most controversial moments in “Bases,” immediately evoking friction 
with the authorities, is the recognition by the Church of the right “to 
refuse to submit to the state” if the latter compels believers to engage 
in sinful acts or to renounce their faith (III.5, paragraph 4). (Scholars 
have cited instances of the Kremlin’s expression of dissatisfaction with 
the monarchist theses of “Bases.” See, for example, Richters 2013: 24.) 
Taken together, these theses form the normative basis for opposition-
al activity by the ROC. With all the murkiness as to what constitutes 
sinful action and which actions will entice believers to renounce their 
faith, Church radicals can view virtually any state action as grounds 
for civil disobedience. Because of the existing dependence of the ROC 
on state structures, the expression of monarchist sympathies by the 
highest bishops of the Church cannot remain without consequenc-
es. Hence, both “Bases” and subsequent official political statements 
made by Church leaders soften the effect in the manner of “however, 
but then again (…).” Indeed, some of the literature notes that “Bases” 
was written in this style, which allows it to achieve a specific tactical 
compromise but to lose, from a strategic perspective, an opportunity 
for the development of theological ideas in Orthodoxy (Kostiuk 2013: 
361; in his analysis Kostiuk refers to the work of Alexander Morozov 
[Morozov 2000]). 
The Two Bodies of the King: The Tradition of “Divine 
Kingship” Theology
One can speak roughly of two traditional perceptions of “monarchy” 
in the ideology of Russian Orthodoxy. One of them closely links the 
Church and the autocracy, taking its cues from historical experience 
and the writings of the Church fathers. In contrast, the second sets 
forth the tradition of the Church’s existence independent of the autoc-
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racy or even in spite of it.⁶ The political history of Byzantium and Rus-
sia offers an abundance of evidence for both viewpoints, in that pe-
riods of the monarchist state’s support of the Church alternated with 
times of persecution (for example, the iconoclastic controversy in Byz-
antium) or complete subordination of the Church to the structures of 
power (the so-called “Synodal period” in imperial Russia).
A similar ambivalence is present in the biblical history of the first 
kings of Israel, lying at the root of the interpretation of monarchy 
in “Bases” and generally central to the Orthodox understanding of 
monarchy. Metropolitan Filaret (Drozdov) wrote in 1848: “The Cre-
ator (…) Himself raised up judges and leaders for this people, He 
Himself reigned over this kingdom (…) finally, He Himself institut-
ed kings over them, and also continued the miraculous signs of His 
supreme rule over the kings.” And further on he continues: “Per-
haps, they say, all this was during the times of theocracy, that is, of 
divine rule, and now the times are different.” In other words, for him 
there is no fundamental difference between the period of the proph-
ets and the subsequent period of the kings; both one and the oth-
er fall into the same category of “theocracy,” since later, too, during 
the government of the kings, divine rule over the people continued 
through God-given rulers. Needless to say, to him the transition to 
monarchy was not a “fall” or some sort of devolution. With an elab-
orate allusion to the Russian Еmpire, the metropolitan writes that in 
our time, too, nothing has really changed: “Has God actually ever ab-
dicated His divine rule over the world and mankind, and particular-
ly over those kingdoms and peoples in whom His spiritual kingdom 
has been predominantly realized and disseminated or that are espe-
cially aligned with His kingdom?” (Filaret [Drozdov] 1888 [1848]: 5). 
In his exposition, the history of King Saul’s dethronement is entirely 
absent, and the discussion of the new period begins with King David 
(Filaret [Drozdov] 1888 [1848]: 10–11). He thereby avoids even the 
mention of a situation in which a monarchical ruler can lose divine 
sanction and, consequently, the throne. His history of the first kings 
of Israel centers on the moment of David’s anointing to the kingship; 
moreover, Filaret emphasizes that this happened long before his ac-
tual accession to the throne. The explanation of this, in the theolo-
6. It is entirely possible to speak of two traditions in the relation of the Christian Church 
toward the state, one of which took shape as follows: “[T]he politically determined cru-
cifixion of Christ, the persecution of the apostles and the first martyrs from the first 
days of Christianity’s existence, established in Christianity the experience of alienation 
from and mistrust toward the state” (Kostiuk 2013: 17).
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gian’s view, is that by divine dispensation David had to be elevated 
above the common people in order to become king, so as to highlight 
especially the transcendental approbation of his power independent 
of his personal feats (they became evident after his anointing) and 
the choice of the people. 
Such an interpretation is standard for many traditional monar-
chies, including the Russian one, the theory of which, in comparison 
with the English monarchy of the Elizabethan period for example, was 
much more weakly developed from both the theological and juridical 
perspectives. The conception of authority propounded by Metropoli-
tan Filaret shows not so much the uniqueness of the Russian “theology 
of rule” as its immaturity, for it differed little from that of the Europe-
an Middle Ages. These theories shared the concept of “the two bodies 
of the king,” according to which the person of the monarch consisted 
not only of his “earthly,” physical nature, but also, through his anoint-
ing to the kingship, of a certain transcendental essence (Kantorowicz 
1997: 47–87; see also Staats 1976). The latter made the earthly king 
into the “reflection” of Christ, a sacred, inviolable being, “God’s anoint-
ed,” to whom “we must submit not as to a person governing the peo-
ple, but as to God himself” (Kovalevski 2011: 9).⁷ 
In medieval Russia, too, the idea of the divine basis of earthly rule 
and the character of the tsar’s supremacy as the “living image” of its 
sacred prototype became established (Andreeva 2007: 193). This is 
the same idea as the medieval concept of “the two bodies of the king,” 
as in the following: “The Christian ruler became the christomimetes — 
literally the ‘actor’ or ‘impersonator’ of Christ — who on the terrestrial 
stage presented the living image of the two-natured God” (Kantorow-
icz 1997 [1957]: 47). According to Iosif Volotsky’s interpretation, “The 
tsar in his nature is like unto all mankind, while in his rule he is like 
the most high God” (quoted in Andreeva 2007: 201). The foundation-
al work of Michael Cherniavsky shows the evolution of the concept of 
the sacred ruler in medieval Rus. In his work Cherniavsky analyzes 
the way that  from the dual image of the prince — “a saint on a throne” 
(that is, a passive passion-sufferer, an imitator of Christ, such as the 
saints Boris and Gleb,⁸ for example) and a “saintly prince” (that is, a 
7. Giorgio Agamben expands upon Kantorowicz’s analysis through the concept homo sac-
er. In his view, the representation of the person of the king stems from his historically 
established status as inviolable, existing beyond the bounds of any jurisdiction, and 
hence primarily political (see Agamben 2011).
8. Konstantin Kostiuk notes that princely saints were canonized “not with a view to their 
own merit as rulers but as passion-bearers” (Kostiuk 2013: 61). If I understand Kos-
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military leader and a martyr for the cause of Christ, such as Alexander 
Nevsky) — arose the conception of the God-given authority of the Or-
thodox tsar, who was not only “holy” himself, but who also represent-
ed the guarantee for the salvation of his people and state (Cherniavs-
ky 1962: 22–23, 76). The theology of “divine kingship” suggested that 
kingly power in itself enjoyed divine origin and needed no special im-
primatur from the Church (Andreeva 2007: 201).  
As in medieval Western Europe, the concept of the tsar’s sacred 
rule gave expression to the secular ruler’s desire for autonomy from 
the Church. (Concerning this, see Figgis 1914, for example.) This ex-
plains in part the persistence of the tradition of the sacralization of au-
thority in the 18th and 19th centuries, when cultural processes already 
in development tended toward secularization and the decree of 1680 
banning the deification of the tsar continued in effect as well (Zhivov 
and Uspenskii 1987: 75; Baehr 1991: 27–29). In 1766, a new edition 
of the prayer service for the Sunday of Orthodoxy [the first Sunday 
in Lent — Editors], in use up to 1917, included the following among 
the anathematized by proclamation of the clergy in the name of the 
Church: “Against those who think that Orthodox rulers come to the 
throne not by special Divine favor toward them and who think that 
with the anointing to the kingship the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not 
poured out on them for the conduct of this lofty office; and therefore 
who dare to revolt and to commit treason against them: anathema” 
(“O chine pravoslaviia”). There is another comparatively late exam-
ple: the regicide of March 1, 1881, which Orthodox and rightist, mon-
archist circles described in medieval terms as a martyr’s death that 
atoned for the sins of the people and the state itself. For example, to 
Fr. John of Kronstadt, Alexander II “became a figure somewhat anal-
ogous to Christ, who died for the sins of the people and for the sake of 
salvation” (Kitsenko [Kizenko] 2006: 290). And note also the phrase: 
“the sacred blood of the Tsar-martyr” (Khoinatskii 1881: 2). 
The anointing of the tsar in the Orthodox rite in Russia, as is well-
known, involved the union of two traditions: the anointing of the tsar 
to the kingship, characteristic of Byzantine and Western European 
tiuk’s thought correctly, then it is hardly possible to agree with it, for the princes were 
glorified as passion-bearers precisely because they were princes. A simple calculation 
performed by Michael Cherniavsky demonstrates that of 14 Kievan princes (from 
Vladimir Sviatoslavovich to Andrei Bogoliubsky) 10 were consecrated as saints; of 12 
Muscovite rulers from the end of the fourteenth to the end of the sixteenth centuries 
seven were canonized, and the canonization of the eighth — Ivan the Terrible (Ivan 
Groznyi) is under discussion in society. Thus, in medieval Russia practically “all princ-
es were seen as saints” (Cherniavsky 1962: 32).  
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monarchical practice, and the sacrament of chrismation, performed 
in Russian Orthodoxy after baptism. The rite of anointing the tsar is 
analogous to the sacrament of chrismation — it symbolizes the second 
birth, thereby exalting the tsar over common mortals and declaring 
to him his special consecrated status. The communing of the tsar also 
over time began to resemble the Eucharist for priests, as if confirm-
ing the idea that the kingship and the priesthood “are the two great-
est gifts,” two positions of equally sacred significance (Zhivov and Us-
penskii 1987: 24; Kostiuk 2013: 87–88). 
Konstantin Kostiuk asserts that in contrast to the West the theolo-
gy of authority developed in a contrary direction in medieval Russia — 
toward the endowment of governance with sacred attributes and the 
erosion of the distinction between the “two cities.” As a result, a spir-
itual mission and eschatological function were ascribed to tsarist rule, 
and the role of the people as a political agent was ignored (Kostiuk 
2013: 108–9, 115). But in the 19th and early 20th centuries ideological 
searchings moved toward the revision of the traditional sacralization 
of authority. It is undeniable, however, that the traditional theology of 
“divine kingship” continued into the 20th century as well, although it 
also ceased to be central to political theology. Accordingly, Sergei Bul-
gakov wrote, “The tsar bears his rule like the cross of Christ, and (…) 
submission to Him can also be through the cross of Christ and in His 
name” (quoted in Kolonitskii 2010: 10). In the same spirit, Kirill Zait-
sev maintained that “only in terms of the Church’s insight is it possi-
ble to understand who the tsar is. Only in God’s Word is it possible to 
find the answer to the question of what the Russian Orthodox king-
dom is” (Zaitsev 2010: 259). 
That which was mainstream in medieval Russia and a tradition-
alist alternative to modernizing ideological projects at the end of the 
imperial period has, in present-day Russia, been pushed to the mar-
gins of political debate. Post-Soviet, radical-right Orthodox thinkers 
also support “divine kingship.” For example, V. L. Kovalevsky writes 
that “the Russian Tsar was chosen to serve by God Himself. He was 
a messenger and servant of the Heavenly Father: a living weapon of 
the all-directing right hand of God, the executor of divine judgments.” 
Vladimir Neviarovich asserts that “it is possible (and imperative) to re-
gard Orthodox monarchy as an integral branch of Orthodox doctrine, 
sufficiently theologically developed and formulated by the fathers and 
learned men of the Church,” the foundation of which was laid in the 
history of King Saul (Neviarovich 2004: 32). In his interpretation of 
this history, Neviarovich draws upon A. P. Lopukhin, a professor at the 
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St. Petersburg Theological Academy, who argued that “during the time 
of the judges the whole life of the people — their religious-moral life as 
well as their political, social and family life — fell into disorder. (…) In 
the absence of a firm ruler to ensure the observance of the laws, moral-
ity (…) declined all the more” (Neviarovich 2004: 38; Lopukhin 1915: 
64). According to this interpretation, not only was the establishment 
of the monarchy not a “fall,” but it signaled a transition to a higher lev-
el of moral perfection in the life of the society (see Neviarovich 2004: 
39). In contemporary monarchist literature, references to Archbish-
op Serafim (Sobolev), the author of the political treatise Russian Ide-
ology, are also popular. In his treatise, Archbishop Serafim analyzes 
in detail the circumstances of Saul’s anointing, refuting the view that 
kingly rule “was established as an indulgence.” The archbishop writes 
that “through its desire to have monarchical rule” the people of Isra-
el in no way “fell; they did not commit a sin. The word ‘prizrekh’ (1 
Samuel 9:16) refers not to indulgence toward sin (…) but toward the 
[people’s] sufferings and toward the establishment of kingly rule as a 
means for their salvation” (Serafim [Sobolev] 2002: 67–68). Serafim 
writes: “Christian monarchical rule received its genesis directly from 
God, the Heavenly King” (Serafim [Sobolev], Filaret [Drozdov], Ioann 
[Maksimovich] 2000: 87). 
In the context of “divine kingship” theology one can consider also 
the radical-right currents among Orthodox intellectuals that develop 
the eschatological and messianic ideas of the Russian tsar as “one who 
holds at bay” (uderzhivaiushchii), that is, as a force of universal sig-
nificance, saving the entire world from tumbling into hell (Aleksan-
dr [Shargunov] 1999). It would be incorrect to suggest that attempts 
to revive the medieval theology of “divine kingship” are marginal in 
contemporary Orthodoxy; a whole series of influential religious me-
dia, including the radio network Radonezh and the news agency The 
Russian People’s Service (Russkaia narodnaia liniia) support the 
monarchist line. 
Monarcho-Skepticism in the Russian Orthodox Church 
As we have seen, the position of “Bases” seriously differs from the the-
ology of “divine kingship.” First, “Bases” holds that “history’s one true 
theocracy existed in ancient Israel before the period of the kings” (III.1, 
paragraph 3). Second, “Bases” clearly favors the view that “the Lord 
(…) regretted their [the people’s] abandonment of divine rule” (III.1, 
paragraph 3), that is, he expressed regret specifically in connection 
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with the change of government from that of “judgeship” to monarchy. 
Patriarch Kirill declares with the same certitude that under judgeship 
morality gradually declined, faith weakened and sinfulness increased 
among the people of Israel. Therefore the introduction of kingly pow-
er was “a deep spiritual tragedy” for ancient Israel, which rejected un-
mediated divine rule and placed over itself an earthly sovereign (Kirill 
[Gundiaev] 2013: 247–48).⁹ 
One also finds representation of the establishment of monarchy 
as a kind of decline, as the lowering of the moral level, in Orthodox 
thought at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. 
For instance, Archbishop Andronik (Nikolsky) noted in 1907: “One 
must completely free oneself from that artificial, forced argument such 
as is typically made from the Holy Scriptures to confirm the exclusive 
correctness and perfection of only the strictly monarchist form of gov-
ernment. I implore every reader not to be alarmed (…) should I, a con-
vinced tsarist, say definitely that there is no such evidence in the Holy 
Scriptures” (Andronik [Nikol’skii] 2004: 353). In his view, the proph-
et Samuel anointed Saul to the kingship only so that “the Jews would 
not forget God completely,” and therefore monarchical rule was only 
“a protection and security against greater evils,” and was not sacred 
(Andronik [Nikol’skii] 2004: 354–55). 
This interpretation of monarchy was close to Nikolai Berdiaev’s po-
sition, articulated in the pages of the journal The Way (Put’), in which 
a polemic arose concerning the interpretation of the story of Saul. Ber-
diaev objected to the notion of a biblical basis for monarchism and to 
the idea of a God-given king that A. Petrov and Grigory Trubetskoy 
supported (Petrov 1926: 134–39; Trubetskoi 1926: 172–75). Accord-
ing to Berdiaev, the Old Testament describes a conflict between theo-
cratic and monarchist ideas, and therefore the power of the king was 
the result of moral decline and the people’s opposition to living under 
a direct theocracy (Berdiaev 1926). The philosopher concluded that 
“monarchy (…) belongs entirely to this world, to the kingdom of Cae-
sar, and its characteristics do not carry over to the Kingdom of God,” 
and therefore there was no defining connection between Orthodoxy 
9. Patriarch Kirill’s position is shared by Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin: “Even monarchy is 
perceived in this document [“The Bases of the Social Conception”] with regret, as a de-
parture from divine rule” (Chaplin 2013). See also Archpriest Georgy Mitrofanov: “Mon-
archy, as with state systems [or “government”] in general, is the result of the Fall of the 
first people.” (“Dolzhen li pravoslavnyi chelovek byt’ monarkhistom?” 2008). Arkady 
Maler takes a similar view: “Therefore when the people demanded that the last judge, 
Samuel, give them a king (…) then the Lord was angry with his people (…) and the very 
establishment of the monarchy was a punishment for Israel” (Maler 2012).
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and monarchy (Berdiaev 1925: 31–32).¹⁰ The “Eurasianist” Nikolai 
Alekseev agreed with Berdiaev, affirming that monarchism was a pa-
gan political concept, while true Christianity should avoid the heresy 
of “divine kingship” (Alekseev 1927).  
This second way of thinking in the Orthodox theology of monar-
chy regards the idea of the tsar’s godlikeness as heretical and blasphe-
mous idolatry. In recent decades, the “liberal” camp of Church intel-
lectuals continued the tradition of Berdiaev. For instance, Hegumen 
Veniamin (Valery Novik) agreed that the monarchist idea had pagan 
roots and declared that autocracy frees people from the burden of free-
dom and responsibility, just as the Grand Inquisitor proposes in Dos-
toevsky’s novel The Brothers Karamazov (Veniamin [Valerii Novik] 
1999: 274–75).
The same Bishops’ Council that adopted “Bases” in the year 2000 
also raised the question of the divine nature of tsarist rule in connec-
tion with the canonization of Nicholas II and members of his family. 
The matter evoked lively debates in society and the decision taken by 
the Council was something of a compromise between the positions of 
the rightists and those of the opponents of canonization. The former 
insisted on the recognition of the canonization of the tsar’s family and 
their servants as martyrs, as the Russian Orthodox Church outside 
Russia (ROCOR) had done in 1981. As a result, the Council honored 
Nicholas II, the empress and their children as passion-sufferers.¹¹ The 
difference between “passion-sufferers” and “martyrs” lies in this: a 
martyr can be merely a person who has suffered for his faith, while a 
passion-sufferer accepted a martyr’s death in imitation of Christ. Fur-
thermore, the Council specially emphasized that Nicholas II was can-
onized not as a tsar and not for his political activities nor ideologi-
10. Compare this with Sergei Bulgakov’s assertion: “Although a certain theurgy is also in-
herent in the nature of tsarist rule, this did not displace nor substitute itself, however, 
for the natural, ‘animal’ principle of power. Tsarist rule still did not become theocrat-
ic through its theurgic aspect. (…) Inspiration by good, as well as by evil, remained 
equally possible for tsarist governance” (Bulgakov 1994 [1917]: 340). See also: “There 
is no dogmatic connection between Orthodoxy and a specific political system” (Bulga-
kov 2006).
11. In a report to the Bishops’ Council the chair of the Synodal Commission on the Canon-
ization of Saints, Metropolitan Yuvenaly (Poiarkov) analyzed in detail the arguments 
for and against the canonization of the imperial family and concluded that Emperor 
Nicholas II, Empress Alexandra, Tsarevich Alexey, and Grand Duchesses Olga, Tatiana, 
Maria and Anastasia underwent suffering and torment before their deaths. “It is in their 
understanding of this feat (…) that the Commission (…) finds it possible to honor in 
the Council these new martyrs and Russian believers with a place among the passion-
sufferers” (Iuvenalii [Poiarkov], Doklad). 
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cal convictions, but as a private person. Finally, the Council specified 
that the canonization of Nicholas II did not signify the sanctification 
of monarchy in general (Russkaia Tserkov’ na rubezhe vekov 2001: 
14–18; Slater 2005; Bodin 2009). With all the historical equivocal-
ity of its decision the Council sought to supersede the medieval Or-
thodox tradition of the sacralization of rulers and simultaneously to 
obtain support from proponents of canonization on the right (and es-
pecially from ROCOR). 
In 2009 the film Tsar, concerning the conflict between Tsar Ivan 
IV and Metropolitan Philip, came to the big screen, directed by Pavel 
Lungin. Oleg Yankovsky, who played the role of the metropolitan, re-
ceived the blessing of Patriarch Alexy II, and the filming began with 
prayers to St. Philip. Theologian Alexander Dvorkin and Hieromonk 
Kosma (Afanasev) served as consultants for the film. The film elicit-
ed positive responses from representatives of the ROC and therefore 
can be regarded as expressing more or less the official position of the 
Moscow Patriarchate on the interrelation of the Church and tsardom 
in general. Two episodes in the film emphasize an extremely negative 
attitude toward Ivan the Terrible. In the first of these, the tsar is en-
ticed to demonstrate his supposedly divine powers by calling down 
lightning, and lightning actually flashes forth, but the metropolitan de-
clares that this power had not a divine but a diabolical source.¹² The 
second episode, by contrast, depicts the metropolitan already in pris-
on, when his fetters fall away miraculously and he discovers he has 
the gift of foreknowledge and of healing others through the laying on 
of hands. (For further details, see Halperin 2013.) Rating the film very 
highly, Protodeacon Andrei Kuraev found it significant that the film, 
which became something of an illustration of the mutual relations be-
tween tsar, Church, and people, came out several months after the en-
thronement of Patriarch Kirill: “Is it by chance or not, that the release 
of this film happened in the first year of the new patriarchate? Will 
it not fall to Patriarch Kirill to inherit not only St. Philip’s throne but 
also his cross? Isn’t this film a kind of spiritual bequest from St. Phil-
ip to Patriarch Kirill?” (Kuraev 2009a).
The film Tsar relates to the Orthodox theology of monarchy in 
many ways, including as an illustration of the idea expressed in “Bas-
es” that the tsar can lose divine sanction. The story of Saul relayed 
12. Compare this with Sergei Averintsev’s evaluation of traditional autocracy in the context 
of the binary logic characteristic of Russian culture: “Autocratic rule is something re-
siding either above the human world or below it, but in any case it seems not to be a 
part of this world” (Averintsev 1988: 220).
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in “Bases” shows that his authority passed to David without any re-
gard for the dynastic principle. Moreover, in contrast to Metropolitan 
Filaret’s interpretation, “Bases” pointedly emphasizes that David was 
the son of a simple man (III.1, paragraph 4) who nonetheless mer-
ited divine favor and was anointed to the kingship. In opposition to 
the views of radical-right intellectuals who want to canonize Ivan IV 
as “a Faithful Saint Tsar,”¹³ the film Tsar depicts Ivan the Terrible as 
a bloody tyrant. The film thereby reflects the position of the Church’s 
highest bishops, in whose view “pseudo-zealots for Orthodoxy and 
autocracy (…) canonize tyrants and adventurists without authoriza-
tion. No one knows whether these people do this deliberately or un-
consciously. If deliberately, then they are provocateurs and enemies of 
the Church, who are trying to compromise the Church” (Aleksii II [Ri-
diger] 2001).¹⁴ 
The film portrays Ivan the Terrible’s moral bankruptcy and politi-
cal failure and thereby lays the groundwork for criticism of the dynas-
tic principle on the grounds that a person unfit for the role may come 
to the throne. Referring to current political events in Russia in 2009, 
Archpriest Dimitry Smirnov, then deputy chair and director of the ad-
ministrative staff of the Patriarchal Commission on Family Matters 
and the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood, asserted that strong 
presidential rule with the transfer of power to a designated “succes-
sor” was better than monarchy, which offers no guarantee against ac-
cidents of birth (Russkii chas 2009). Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeev) 
has spoken similarly: in his view monarchy is not the best form of gov-
ernment, for in history there have been various monarchs, some wor-
thy and some not, and various presidents, but monarchy intrinsically 
does not preclude the transfer of power to an unworthy successor (Il-
arion [Alfeev] 2013). 
13. A recent initiative by supporters of the canonization of Ivan the Terrible was their de-
mand to remove the painting by Ilia Repin, “Ivan the Terrible and His Son Ivan, No-
vember 16, 1581,” from the halls of the Tretiakov Gallery on the basis that it is “vile, 
slanderous and false both in its subject matter and as a pictorial representation” and 
“offend[s] the patriotic feelings of the Russian people” (“Eta kartina oskorbliaet patri-
oticheskie chuvstva russkikh liudei” 2013). The communication to Minister of Culture 
Vladimir Medinsky was signed by Vasily Boiko-Veliky, Igor Froianov and the (former) 
priest Alexy Averianov. 
14. Compare this with Patriarch Kirill’s statement — “Tsar Ioann the Terrible (…) commit-
ted lawless deeds (…) a sea of blood was spilt in Rus” (Kirill [Gundiaev] 2010b: 96) — 
and that of Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeev) — “Ivan the Terrible (…) turned into a bloody 
tyrant who brought the country to socio-economic crisis” (Ilarion [Alfeev] 2010: 148). 
See also “K voprosu o kanonizatsii tsaria Ivana Groznogo i G. E. Rasputina,” 2008. 
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Patriarch Kirill, despite his idealization of pre-Petrine Rus, also re-
frains from unequivocal support for autocracy. He has followed the ca-
nonical Slavophile theory about the harmony between tsar, patriarch 
and people in Muscovite Rus. The system of “checks” on tsarist rule 
included the authority of the Church, Church councils, Assemblies of 
the Land, and the practice of petitioning, in other words, the unme-
diated communication of the people with the tsar. For this reason the 
ancient Russian autocracy, according to Patriarch Kirill, did not re-
semble Western absolutism but came quite close to the ideal of “sym-
phony” (Kirill [Gundiaev] 2010a: 250–51; 2010d: 83; 2010b: 95–96). 
At the same time, the Church’s subordinate position during the Synod-
al period, when it became part of the state apparatus, has not been for-
gotten.¹⁵ Acknowledging the merits of autocracy in the past, Patriarch 
Kirill revises the formulation of “symphony” so that the concept of 
“monarchy” in it becomes the concept of “the state” in general. In par-
ticular, he has repeatedly affirmed that it is precisely today in post-So-
viet Russia, and not in the pre-revolutionary period, that church-state 
relations have approached most closely to the ideal of “symphony,” 
that is, the ideal of mutual non-interference in matters of the respec-
tive exclusive “jurisdictions” of the state and the Church and of mutual 
support in the remaining spheres (Kirill [Gundiaev] 2010a: 231). The 
topic of autocracy is often present in the discourses of Church leaders 
“apophatically,” through its absence; for instance, speaking of the “ca-
lamities” that befell Russia after 1917, Patriarch Kirill mentioned “the 
grievous sin of apostasy committed by the entire people, (…) trampling 
on what is holy, (…) blasphemy and the mocking of the Church, of sa-
cred relics, of faith” (Kirill [Gundiaev] 2010b: 57), but he did not re-
fer to the fall of the monarchy and the execution of the imperial family.
“The People Must Be Ready for Monarchy”: Autocracy 
or Popular Rule? 
One can conclude from reading the story of Saul in “Bases” that the 
document injects elements of popular rule into the theory of Ortho-
dox monarchy. “Bases” depicts the rise of the state as “God granting 
the people the opportunity to arrange their own social life based upon 
15. See, for example: “The Church did not have an independent stance on social and polit-
ical questions and could not, because it was part of the state apparatus” (Kirill [Gun-
diaev] 2010c: 29). See also Aleksii II (Ridiger) 2005: 214, 439. And Metropolitan Hi-
larion reminds us that the very restoration of the patriarchate became possible only 
after the fall of the monarchy (Ilarion [Alfeev] 2011: 166). 
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the free expression of their will” (III.1, paragraph 4). Lungin’s film 
also shows that the ultimate downfall for Ivan the Terrible was not di-
vine punishment but the nonviolent opposition of his own people. The 
scene of the deposition of Metropolitan Philip shows the role of the 
Church in condemning the tsar’s actions in the eyes of the people; the 
very last scene portrays the solitary tsar, waiting in vain for “his peo-
ple” on a tsarist holiday.
The presence of this “democratic” element in Orthodox political 
theory is not at all self-evident, for it represents a departure from the 
canonical reading of tsarist rule as divinely established, with its source 
of legitimacy not in the will of the people but in the anointing of the 
tsar to the throne. The exposition of Saul’s history in “Bases” once 
again leaves room for ambiguous interpretation: the establishment of 
monarchy was an act of divine indulgence (milost’) toward the “free 
expression of the will” of the people, but in this reading what exact-
ly is the source of this authority — divine indulgence or the will of the 
people — remains for the commentators to determine. All the same, 
the political language itself in “Bases” (“free expression of the will” 
and such like) shows how deeply the theory of popular sovereignty 
has penetrated into the Orthodox political tradition. Let us turn once 
more to the above-cited paragraph of “Bases” (III.7, paragraph 3): 
“One can by no means exclude the possibility of a spiritual renewal of 
society such that a religiously higher form of state structure becomes 
natural,” but now let us focus on the concept of the “renewal of soci-
ety.” Then Metropolitan Kirill clarified this idea in a speech on March 
27, 2007, in which he provided his own interpretation of the fall of 
the monarchy in 1917: “The moral state of the people no longer cor-
responded to the monarchist principle of state structure.” In his view, 
monarchy “requires almost 100-percent religiosity among the people 
and society; the universal belief that the tsar is the anointed sovereign 
is essential.” Raising the question of the possibility of monarchy amid 
the contemporary religious-moral state of Russian society, the future 
Patriarch Kirill remarked that if today monarchy were “by some mira-
cle to be restored and if, God forbid, the tsar were to make some sort 
of mistake, they would throw tomatoes and rotten eggs at him just as 
they would at any feckless mayor” (Kirill [Gundiaev] 2007). 
Commenting on Patriarch Kirill’s speech, Andrei Kuraev connects 
the “monarchist principle” with the principle of Christian asceticism, 
of “self-diminishment,” of “kenosis,” arguing that under a monar-
chy the subjects must be prepared for unquestioning obedience, for 
“monarchy is the renunciation of one’s own will and the entrusting of 
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it to Divine Providence (…). People have to relax their clenched hands 
from the rude gestures to which they became accustomed during the 
years of co-rule and democracy into open palms, ready to receive eve-
rything that will issue from the throne as Divine Providence” (Kuraev 
2009b: 390). But today, too, in Russia there is a “particle” of monar-
chy — the Moscow Patriarchate. “If our monarchists cannot take an 
oath to refrain from criticism of the Patriarch, how will they be able 
to keep themselves from criticizing a monarch?” (Kuraev 2009b: 391–
92). In sum, a good monarchist must be an Orthodox believer. Leav-
ing aside the question of whether the converse is true or not,¹⁶ one 
can note that Andrei Kuraev also links monarchy with the formation 
of political agency in the (church-going) people. Many Church rep-
resentatives hold the same view, that the people must be prepared 
for monarchy, and the degree of their integration into the life of the 
Church indicates this readiness. For example, Archpriest Maxim Ko-
zlov, Archpriest Vladislav Sveshnikov, Archpriest Alexander Iliashenko, 
Archpriest Andrei Spiridonov, Archimandrite Platon Igumnov and oth-
ers support this position. In these authors’ works one can read such 
statements as these: “Monarchy can emerge when broad layers of so-
ciety are found ready to acknowledge themselves as subjects of a sov-
ereign”; “The chief prerequisite for the establishment of monarchy is 
moral and spiritual maturity and society’s readiness to embrace it”; 
“One can raise the question of monarchy only if the people themselves 
truly feel that this is not forced upon them and is not the imposition 
of something alien”; “If it [society] wants to declare itself democratic, 
traditional monarchy is impossible”; “We simply have not grown up 
to this level [the establishment of a monarchy]; we still have not ma-
tured,” and so forth (“Monarkhiia” 2012). There can be different read-
ings of this matter: either the people are still not ready for monarchy 
or, as Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin writes, the ideal of monarchy nev-
er “was lost”¹⁷ among the people — but, in essence, the matter at is-
sue here is one and the same, namely the inclusion of elements of the 
16. The answer among the radical right to this question is unequivocally affirmative. See 
this quotation from Metropolitan Vladimir Bogoiavlensky: “A priest who is not a mon-
archist is not worthy of standing before the Holy Altar” (Neviarovich 2004: 21). See 
also the statement by Viacheslav Klykov: “A truly Orthodox person is first and foremost 
a monarchist” (Klykov 1996). 
17. At a meeting with deputies from the Duma faction “United Russia” (Edinaia Rossiia) 
in May 2010, Vsevolod Chaplin declared that “the people must mature for monarchy”; 
and on November 3 that same year at an exhibit and forum entitled “Orthodox Rus” he 
called for the rectification of the “failure of legitimacy” of the existing system, a failure 
that came about because of the 1917 revolution (Malashenko and Filatov 2012: 63). 
MIKHAIL  SUSLOV
VOL . 3 ( 1 )  ·  2016   49
theory of popular sovereignty at the very heart of Orthodox discourse 
on monarchy. 
Contemporary “divine kingship,” too, contains the same “demo-
cratic” element of the concept of “the renewal of society” but with the 
stress on nationalism. The representation of Nicholas II as a “redeem-
er” indirectly constructs a political subject, for the term “redemption” 
implies some sort of subject, a certain “we,” who “are redeemed.” The 
construction of “we” becomes still more prominently evident in that 
version of “divine kingship” that requires universal repentance for 
the sin of regicide, since the question “Who are the ‘we’ who must re-
pent?” becomes unavoidable. The idea of repentance by the whole peo-
ple thereby becomes an instrument for the nationalization of political 
discourse. Note Vladimir Neviarovich’s statement: “Over each of us 
hangs the mortal sin of regicide. (…) First and foremost in this repent-
ance is the recognition of oneself as one small part of the Russian peo-
ple” (Neviarovich 2004: 262). Although the topic of collective repent-
ance’s political significance has been insufficiently researched in the 
literature (see for example, Celermajer 2009), it is possible to assert 
with sufficient conviction that the rituals and rhetoric of national re-
pentance possess great potential for the formation of national identi-
ty. Within Russian culture, Alexander Solzhenitsyn has made the most 
influential statement of the link between the nation and collective re-
pentance in his 1973 article, “Repentance and Self-Limitation as As-
pects of National Life” (Solzhenitsyn 1995 [1973]). As one might ex-
pect, “repentance and self-limitation” are precisely the concepts most 
applied to contemporary discourse about the restoration of monarchy: 
repentance for the sin of regicide and “monarchical kenosis,” men-
tioned above by Andrei Kuraev.
The Slavophile Ideology of Autocracy
One cannot say that the “democratic” element came into monarchist 
ideology only recently. On the contrary, the highest attainments of the 
Orthodox theology of secular authority were connected to the search 
for a political agent in the 19th and early 20th centuries, first and fore-
most in the Slavophile tradition, in which the autocracy was significant 
insofar as it was an indication of the high spiritual condition of the peo-
Compare with the words of Archpriest Gennady Belovolov: “Our people are by their na-
ture monarchist” (“Svetskaia konstitutsionnaia monarkhiia” 2011). 
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ple (D. Kh. [Khomiakov] 1903 [1899]: 40).¹⁸ To the classic Slavophile 
thinkers, the notion of autocracy did not exclude, but rather assumed, 
an element of popular rule in line with the sacramental formula, “the 
people opine, the tsar decides.” A note by Archbishop of Perm Andron-
ik [Nikolsky] in 1907 provides evidence of the penetration of Slavophile 
rhetoric into the Church milieu: “The autocracy, created in history by 
the people themselves and resting on the complete union of the Tsar 
with the people, the enduring expression of which was the Assemblies of 
the Land called by the Tsar as was the custom to take counsel with the 
realm, to hear the people’s will — namely this was our unwritten consti-
tution, according to which there is no Tsar without a people, nor a peo-
ple without a Tsar: from the land comes counsel and will, while from the 
Tsar comes decision and rule” (Andronik [Nikolskii] 2004: 359). Slav-
ophile thought contrasted such a union of tsar and people with the bu-
reaucratic rule of absolute monarchies, as well as with the despotic gov-
ernment of a single individual and with parliamentary democracy. 
The theological ideas of classical Slavophilism exerted an excep-
tionally powerful influence on the intellectual climate of the late im-
perial and émigré social-philosophical and theological debates and 
continue to resound in contemporary discussions. The concept of the 
Assembly of the Land, the idea that the people’s will installed the Ro-
manov dynasty on the throne through the Assembly of the Land of 
1613, was central to Slavophile ideology (for example, see Koshel-
ev 1862; Sharapov 1907). Later Slavophilism sought to develop more 
specific and juridically functional forms of “a people’s monarchy,” in 
which the people would possess not only “opinion” but also, to a cer-
tain degree, “decision.” At issue was the concept of the integration 
of autocracy and local popular self-government; the publicist Sergei 
Sharapov (1855–1911) elaborated the most complete theory of such a 
state structure. 
The concept of rule-of-law autocracy (pravovoe samoderzhavie) — 
the idea that in contrast to despotism, Russian autocracy implied strict 
observance of the law — was one of the principal bases of the neo-
Slavophiles’ theory. In the neo-Slavophiles’ view, although the will of 
an unlimited monarch was the source of legislative authority, this in 
no way meant that his subjects had to endure arbitrariness and law-
lessness (Vasil’ev 1883; Vasil’ev 1890: 70). First, as the jurist-theoreti-
18. Compare this with Konstantin Aksakov’s statement: “We have had tsars who were im-
postors but no anointing oil for the impostor” (quoted in Slavianofil’stvo i zapadnich-
estvo 1991: 82).
MIKHAIL  SUSLOV
VOL . 3 ( 1 )  ·  2016   51
cians of tsarist Russia demonstrated, the laws approved by the mon-
arch were binding on the tsar himself (of course, until such time as 
he desired to abrogate or change them). And second, the law-making 
process itself was also law-governed and followed a definite, sufficient-
ly complex procedure rather than happening spontaneously upon the 
whim of the monarch (Korkunov 1892–93: 217–19). 
A second and very important premise of neo-Slavophile analysis lay 
in the recognition of the people’s legal capability, that is, the people’s 
ability and opportunity to participate actively in political life and the 
adoption of decisions of state-level importance. Sharapov attempted to 
reconcile this premise with the concept of the tsar’s unlimited rule, and 
developed the idea of two sources of authority — autocracy and self-rule. 
In his view, the authority of the autocrat had a divine origin and there-
fore was indivisible and non-transferable. In other words, it was laugh-
able and blasphemous to think that the tsar could delegate part of his 
divine authority to a minister, and then the minister to a department 
head, and so on all the way down to the local constable. On this read-
ing, only the tsar had complete authority, but how could this be when 
speaking of such a colossal and populous state as Russia? The tsar can-
not interfere in every trifling case happening in the provinces, but nei-
ther can he delegate his authority to resolve the case “to the grassroots.” 
This means that there must be a second source of authority, too — the 
people, who can, through a system of elections, delegate the resolu-
tion of their local matters at the levels of the township (volost’), county 
(uezd) and upward all the way to the central ministries (Sharapov 1905; 
Sharapov 1902). In practice this means that the tsar’s prerogative relates 
to the most important state affairs, such as war and peace, the army and 
navy, railroads and finances, as well as oversight, while primarily local 
matters (education, policing, road building and so on) come under the 
purview of the people’s representatives.  
In 1905 an extensive essay by Lev Tikhomirov appeared entitled 
Monarchist Statehood,¹⁹ in which Tikhomirov grounded the possibil-
ity and desirability of autocracy at the most elementary, psychological 
level. He demonstrated that monarchy is psychologically very near to 
a person, since it embodies the authority of moral principle — univer-
19. Written in very weighty language, the book did not become a bestseller in monarchist 
circles. Archpriest Ioann Vostorgov took upon himself the role of popularizer of Tik-
homirov’s ideas; in 1911 he published his own work, The Monarchist Catechism, based 
upon Monarchist Statehood (Vostorgov 1995).
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sal for all people — over formal legal and bureaucratic norms.²⁰ One 
can imagine such a perspective in the context of natural law theory. In 
the spirit of Thomism Tikhomirov brought natural law together with 
divine law: if people were perfect, then natural law would completely 
coincide with divine law, but after the Fall, the necessity for positive 
law arose; and positive law can differ greatly from divine law. In such 
a case, the essence of monarchy lies in establishing the union of divine 
and natural law and of overcoming the dominance of positive law. Tik-
homirov rejected the concept of “symphony” at the institutional lev-
el and criticized the Byzantine tradition of the Church’s subordination 
to state interests; he affirmed that the tsar and the Church should be 
united at another, more fundamental level, at the level of the human 
personality. At that level the Church’s role consists of the instilling of 
religious morals, while the tsar’s role is the expression of the people’s 
moral ideals through political decision-making (Tikhomirov 1905). 
The definitive crystallization of the “people’s monarchy” concept 
takes place in Tikhomirov’s works, for in contrast to the Slavophiles’ 
theory, he — without entirely rejecting the divine nature of tsarist au-
thority — interprets that authority in a circumscribed way and fus-
es it ultimately with the people’s will (which in the last analysis is 
not surprising for a former member of the People’s Will [Narodnaia 
Vol’ia]). The idea that the tsar expresses the people’s moral ideal re-
turns to the Church its key role as the guarantor of morality and re-
ligious salvation, a role taken from it by the sacred power of the tsar 
as understood in medieval theology. It was precisely for this reason 
that such an interpretation attracted support in post-Soviet politi-
cal theology, with the groundwork laid by intellectuals from the reli-
gious and philosophical renaissance of the early 20th century in both 
the Russian Empire and in emigration. For example, Nikolai Berdi-
aev wrote that under autocracy “the tsar and the people are linked to 
each other by one and the same faith, by one and the same submis-
sion to the Church and to God’s truth. Autocracy presupposes a wide 
popular social base” (Berdiaev 1925: 33–34). The rite of coronation 
and anointing of the tsar was subjected to distinctive interpretation in 
this period. Sergei Bulgakov, for example, noted that through the rite 
20. See, for example: “A monarchical supreme authority more effectively secures individu-
al rights. (…) This conclusion derives from the fact that monarchy (…) is namely formed 
solely by the ethical principle” (Vereshchagin, Makeev and Ponezhin 2003: 56). Tik-
homirov’s ideas were taken up by Ivan Ilin. Cf., “True monarchy is realized only through 
the inner activity of the soul and spirit. It introduces into politics a principle of intima-
cy, devotion, warmth and heart-felt emotion” (Il’in 1979: 506).
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“a special, sacred-erotic bond is established with the people” (Bulga-
kov 1994 [1917]: 340). Note also the statement by Archpriest Ioann 
Vostorgov: “Here [in the anointing] the Tsar, crowned by God, enters 
into a holy sacramental union with his people” (Vostorgov 2011: 31). 
The metaphor of the state as a family, again coming to the surface of 
the political discourse in “Bases” (III.1, paragraph 2), has particular 
significance for monarchist consciousness, in which the image of the 
tsar mingles with the image of the “husband,” and coronation to the 
throne with the sacrament of crowning the bride and groom (Ioann 
[Snychev] 2012 [1994]: 494).
In this intellectual tradition, dominant in Church discussions at the 
turn of the 20th century, an understanding of the supernatural, divine 
nature of tsarist rule merges with the concept of popular sovereign-
ty. Contemporaries commented upon the artificiality of such a com-
bination. Vladimir Soloviev, and subsequently Pavel Florensky  and 
Sergei Bulgakov, criticized the ideas of the Slavophiles, and of Alex-
ey Khomiakov in particular, for their excessive devotion to “democ-
ratism” (Florenskii 1996 [1913]; on this see also Paromov 2011). In 
1917 Sergei Bulgakov decried the “temptation of democracy” in Ortho-
dox thought, alluding specifically to Slavophilism and populism with 
their tendency to deify the people and their faith in the “Father-Tsar 
(tsar-batiushka)”²¹ and to mix the sacred and the profane (Bulgak-
ov 2009 [1917]: 30). Bulgakov noted that the Orthodox Church was a 
church of the common people, a people’s church, and therefore for it 
the allure of democracy was especially strong in comparison with oth-
er Christian churches.
Despite this critique, the further “mainstream” development of Or-
thodox political thought was linked primarily to the Slavophile and 
populist tradition. The works of Ivan Ilin have exerted particular in-
fluence on the contemporary understanding of monarchy, including in 
Church circles; Ilin proposed a sort of synthesis of the neo-Slavophile 
“popular autocracy” and Tikhomirov’s “natural law” with emphasis on 
the latter. Especially indicative of Tikhomirov’s influence was the idea 
that the level of popular legal consciousness determines the form of 
state rule. (See, for example, Zernov 2007: 12.) It is specifically Ilin’s 
formulation of the notion that “the restoration of the monarchy (…) is 
unthinkable without a simultaneous spiritual rebirth” of the Russian 
people that resurfaces in books by Metropolitan Ioann (Snychev) and 
other monarchists of our day (see Ioann [Snychev] 2011: 102). Ivan 
21. The term batiushka is a traditional term for a father or a priest. — Translator. 
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Solonevich’s People’s Monarchy (1973) is another source of inspiration 
for contemporary monarchists; to a significant degree it continues the 
Slavophile tradition of the nationalization of the theory of monarchy. 
In this theory, the monarch is necessary so that “the personal fate of 
individuals is knitted together into a single whole with the fate of the 
nation” (Solonevich 1991: 89). 
Conclusion
In this article I have examined two main sources of theorizing about 
monarchy: the medieval concept of “divine kingship” and the mod-
ernizing Slavophile project of introducing elements of the theory of 
popular sovereignty into the understanding of monarchy. Although 
both traditions coexist in contemporary Russia, their proportion and 
the nature of their interaction have shifted toward the marginaliza-
tion of “divine kingship.” Having adopted “Bases,” the leadership of 
the ROC made a decisive choice in favor of the Slavophile interpreta-
tion. First, the divine nature of governance in general and of the tsar’s 
in particular was rejected. Second, monarchy was recognized as a less 
lofty form of government than “judgeship.” Third, and this is key, the 
question of monarchy was transferred onto the social-ethical plane; 
monarchy was recognized to be morally more beneficial for the peo-
ple and its restoration was considered possible provided that there 
was a “spiritual inspiration of society.” The “people” were thereby rec-
ognized as a political agent, as the main beneficiary of monarchy and 
as its foundation.
Consequently, even while dreaming of pre-Petrine Rus and the 
“symphony” that allegedly existed in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries, 
contemporary Orthodox monarchist intellectuals reconstruct not the 
concept of theological “divine kingship” that existed at that time, but 
rather the ideas characteristic of the final stage of the Russian monar-
chist tradition, which developed at the turn of the 20th century. The 
neo-Slavophiles and conservative monarchists of the late imperial pe-
riod expended their intellectual efforts toward the rational ground-
ing and justification of the already tottering and “morally obsolescent” 
monarchy; these efforts therefore were necessarily contradictory. The 
attempt to reconcile the historically dying tradition of “divine king-
ship” with the idea of popular self-rule was not successful then dur-
ing the pre-revolutionary years, and cannot be logically well-grounded 
in our day. That is, monarchism cannot stop short of the stage of the 
Slavophile conceptual mixture, and its proponents are compelled to 
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take either a step “backward,” toward “divine kingship,” which means 
toward political marginalization, or “forward,” toward a nationalist in-
terpretation of monarchy. 
The socio-political characteristics of traditional Russian Ortho-
dox monarchy can be described by the concept of “empire,” that is, as 
a “composite society,”²² a community of subjects of the tsar that was 
amorphous, heterogeneous, and exhibiting very weak — if they exist-
ed at all — internal bonds. Despite distinct attempts at “Russification” 
at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, “the 
nation” did not act in the capacity of a political end and self-sufficient 
entity, but rather served as a basis for loyalty to the autocracy (as in 
Sergei Uvarov’s theory of “Official Nationality”). In the present cir-
cumstances, a community of subjects of a virtual tsar imagines itself 
with radically different traits — as a homogeneous, close-knit “peo-
ple,” drawn tightly together by “bonds” of Russian “national” belong-
ing and Orthodox faith. Monarchy appears not as the cause but as the 
consequence of the existence of such a people. It is important to em-
phasize that the territorial bounds of the “Orthodox people” extend be-
yond the borders of the actual Russian Federation and are conceptu-
alized by the notions of the “Russian World” (Russkii mir) and “Holy 
Rus,” thereby announcing the potentially irredentist dimension of the 
imagined Russian monarchy. 
Monarchy in its “non-autocratic,” constitutional sense can also fit 
in quite well even in contemporary political debates tinged with na-
tionalism as yet another instrument for the grafting together of the 
“nation” and as an important element in the ROC’s new political lan-
guage. In this manner, debates over monarchy serve as a unique in-
tellectual proving ground for the Church in which the applicability of 
different traditions of political theology is tested and the working out 
of a new approach is proceeding — an approach that would empha-
size the ideological self-sufficiency of the Church, that would be the-
ologically sound and at the same time practically applicable as a pro-
gram of political action. 
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